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Background: COVID-19 has the potential to cause outbreaks in hospitals. Given the
comorbid and elderly cohort of patients hospitalized, hospital-acquired COVID-19 infec-
tion is often fatal. Pathogen genome sequencing is becoming increasingly important in
infection prevention and control (IPC).
Aim: To inform the understanding of in-hospital SARS-CoV-2 transmission in order to
improve IPC practices and to inform the future development of virological testing for IPC.
Methods: Patients detected COVID-19 positive by polymerase chain reaction on Ward A in
April and May 2020 were included with contact tracing to identify other potential cases.
Genome sequencing was undertaken for a subgroup of cases. Epidemiological, genomic,
and cluster analyses were performed to describe the epidemiology and to identify factors
contributing to the outbreak.
Findings: Fourteen cases were identified on Ward A. Contact tracing identified 16 further
patient cases; in addition, eight healthcare workers (HCWs) were identified as being
COVID-19 positive through a round of asymptomatic testing. Genome sequencing of 16 of
these cases identified viral genomes differing by two single nucleotide polymorphisms or
fewer, with further cluster analysis identifying two groups of infection (a five-person group
and a six-person group).nd Sussex University Hospitals NHS Trust, Brighton, BN2 5BE, UK. Tel.: þ447766165801.
Wenlock).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
ivecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
R.D. Wenlock et al. / Infection Prevention in Practice 3 (2021) 1001652Conclusion: Despite the temporal relationship of cases, genome sequencing identified
that not all cases shared transmission events. However, 11 samples were found to be
closely related and these likely represented in-hospital transmission. This included three
HCWs, thereby confirming transmission between patients and HCWs.
ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant disruption
and mortality globally. Up to April 11th, 2021, there have been
150 million cases of COVID-19 worldwide and more than three
million deaths [1]. There is growing evidence that hospital-
acquired infections are occurring and that they carry a sig-
nificant mortality risk [2e4]. The sequencing of pathogen
genomes has proven fruitful in previous communicable disease
outbreaks and is already demonstrating utility in responding to
the COVID-19 pandemic [5e8].
In this report, the authors investigate an outbreak of COVID-
19 on an elderly care ward at a hospital in the UK using epi-
demiological and genomic methods. The aim of this study was
to better understand in-hospital SARS-CoV-2 transmission in
order to improve immediate infection prevention and control
(IPC) and to explore the potential use of virological testing for
IPC purposes.
Methods
The investigation was retrospective, did not alter the
management of the patients involved, and is reported in line
with the ORION checklist for reporting an outbreak [9].
Ethics statement
Informed consent was not gained from patients involved in
this outbreak. All patients were managed according to clinical
judgement and infection control practices in order to treat
them and control the outbreak according to local guidelines.
Patients did not undergo randomization or intervention for the
purpose of this report. Data have been analysed and presented
anonymously.
Healthcare setting and affected patient population
Ward A is a 17-bed all-male elderly medicine ward at the
Royal Sussex County Hospital (RSCH), a tertiary centre in East
Sussex, UK. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ward A was
designated for patients with no clinical, radiological, or poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) evidence of COVID-19 infection
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Green’). Ward A has two bays,
connected with a corridor, but due to the shared facilities
(toilets, kitchen, and staff) it was considered as one area in this
analysis.
All patients presenting to the hospital were assessed for
clinical signs of COVID-19. Patients were admitted to Green
wards only if a specialty registrar or consultant deemed thatCOVID-19 infection was unlikely. The decision was based pri-
marily upon the absence of symptoms or radiographic features
of COVID-19 as SARS-COV-2 PCR tests took >24 h to return a
result. Until April 27th, 2020, PCR testing for SARS-COV-2 was
reserved for patients displaying symptoms of COVID-19
(shortness of breath, hypoxia, fever, or cough). However,
after that time, hospital policy advised that all patients
undergo an admission PCR test. Patients without COVID-19
symptoms could be moved to a Green ward before their PCR
result was available.
Testing and laboratory methods
Testing for SARS-CoV-2 was performed by real-time reverse
transcriptase (RT)ePCR method in the department of micro-
biology and infection (RSCH). The targets for the test include
ORF1ab and E genes. The manufacturer reported 100% specif-
icity and 95% sensitivity (with analytical detection limit of 25
copies/rxn). A random and limited number of positive samples
in this study were then identified and assigned unique and
anonymized COG IDs. A minimum of 25 mL of RNA extract was
prepared for each participant sample in this study and then
sent for sequencing to the research laboratory at Queen Alex-
andra Hospital in Portsmouth as per COG UK Sample Transfer
Standard Operating Procedure.
For sequencing, viral RNA samples were processed using the
ARTIC nCoV-2019 sequencing protocol (GunIt) V.2 [10]. Full
details of the laboratory methods and sequencing protocol can
be found in the Appendix [11e13].
Analytical methods
Definitions
‘Primary cases’ were any patient detected as SARS-CoV-2
PCR positive while on Ward A. Patients were ‘contacts’ if
they shared Ward A with a primary case in the 14 days (the
incubation period of SARS-CoV-2) before or after the primary
case’s positive result. Contacts with a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR
result within 21 days of the primary case were considered
involved in the outbreak and defined as ‘secondary cases’. The
timeframe of 21 days was selected to capture the incubation
period of SARS-CoV-2 with some additional range given the
relatively low availability of testing.
The symptoms of COVID-19 investigated in this study were:
new, persistent cough; hypoxia; shortness of breath; fever
>37.5C and anosmia.
Case-finding methods
All patients detected as COVID-19 positive on Ward A in
MarcheMay 2020 were identified through the hospital COVID-19
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these patients from their clinical notes and the electronic bed
management system (Medway). Electronically stored patient
lists were used to identify contacts. The clinical history of
contacts was evaluated to identify any evidence of COVID-19
infection within 21 days of contact. If positive, their loca-
tions were extracted, and their patient contacts traced. This
process was repeated until there were no further contacts.
Although not routine, all healthcare workers (HCWs) who
worked onWard A on May 29th and 30th, 2020, underwent an ad-
hoc round of PCR testing on those days as part of the outbreak
investigation and the results are included here.
Data analysis
Data were extracted in June 2020 and sequencing per-
formed in August 2020. Data processing was performed in R
(v1.2.5033), visualization with ggPlot2 (vs3.3.2), and iGraph
(v1.2.6). The package transcluster (v0.1.0) in R was used to
analyse the relatedness of case sequence data [14]. Based on
previously published work, the serial transmission interval (b)
was set at 5 days, the viral mutation rate (l) at two mutations
per month, and a probability threshold of 80% [5,6,14]. The
number of inferred transmission events (T) was varied from one
to 10. This allowed for the possibility that there were unde-
tected cases in the clusters that contributed to the trans-
mission chains. As a comparison, given the relatively low
mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2, samples differing by two single
nucleotide polymorephisms (SNPs) or fewer were considered
related in a second analysis [5,15].
A descriptive root-cause analysis was subsequently
undertaken.
Results
During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, 14 cases of
COVID-19 infection were detected on Ward A. Six of the cases
were detected between April 4th and 12th, 2020, following
which there was a 41-day period with no COVID-19 cases on
Ward A. Another case was detected on the May 23rd, 2020, with
seven patients subsequently testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 on
Ward A in the week following. The two groupings of cases are
subsequently referred to as Cluster One (April 4th to April 12th)
and Cluster Two (May 23rd to May 26th) (Table I). Figure 1 dis-
plays the epidemiological curve of cases found on Ward A (red
bars).
Cluster One
On April 4th, 2020 (three days into their Ward A admission),
while displaying symptoms of a respiratory infection, Patient 1
was tested for SARS-CoV-2 and returned a positive result. In the
following eight days, five inpatients on Ward A developed res-
piratory symptoms and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (Patients
2e6). They had been on Ward A for between four and 32 days
prior to their COVID-19 diagnoses. Only one of the patients had
previously undergone SARS-CoV-2 PCR testing (Patient 3, prior
to their admission to Ward A; Figure 2; Appendix).
Contact tracing identified 114 patients who could have
plausibly been exposed to COVID-19 onWard A or have been the
source of infection. Thirteen met the definition for secondary
cases, as they had had a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR result in the
21 days before or after their contact on Ward A.Three of the secondary cases had been diagnosed with
COVID-19 earlier in their hospital admission and were trans-
ferred to Ward A from a COVID-19 ward 10 days after their
positive PCR result as they were no longer deemed infectious
(Patients 7e9). As they were only present on Ward A when not
infectious, these cases were considered not to be related to
the others in Cluster One (Figure 2).
The remaining 10 cases had their positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR
result after contact on Ward A. Patient 19 had tested positive
on a different ward after transferring from Ward A whereas the
remaining nine patients were discharged from hospital, and
then all tested positive in accident and emergency on read-
mission into hospital (Patients 10e18). Out of the 10, only three
had undergone SARS-CoV-2 PCR testing during their previous
admission (all of which were negative). In addition, case note
review identified that household members of both patients 10
and 13 were also admitted to hospital and tested positive
(Patients 20 and 21, respectively).
Contact tracing broadened the scope of the investigation
from the six cases on Ward A to 18 positive cases in total.
Thirteen samples were sequenced (Patients 1e6 and 10e16),
and their SNP differences are illustrated in Figure 3. Ten sam-
ples were fewer than two SNPs different to others and formed
seven- and three-sample groups (Appendix). Due to the low
proportion of samples sequenced and the time elapsed in the
outbreak, cluster analysis was performed allowing for three
intermediate transmissions (T  3). This revealed six samples
compatible with in-hospital transmission and suggests that
seven of the cases were unrelated to others in the outbreak
(Figure 4). The six-patient group included Patient 10, whose
household member (Patient 21) was also subsequently admit-
ted positive for SARS-CoV-2.
Cluster Two
On May 23rd, 2020, the clinical team identified that Patient
22 had been transferred to Ward A without having the (at that
time) mandatory admission SARS-CoV-2 PCR test. They were
asymptomatic at the time, were tested, and returned a pos-
itive result. All of the other patients on the ward underwent
asymptomatic screening for COVID-19 infection, with seven
testing positive by May 26th (Patients 23e29). Forty-one con-
tacts were traced, one testing positive on readmission to hos-
pital post-discharge on June 2nd (Patient 30). Except for patient
22, all of the positive cases in Cluster Two had a negative SARS-
CoV-2 PCR test earlier in their hospital admission.
Given the developing outbreak, all HCWs working on Ward A
on May 29th and 30th underwent an ad-hoc round of asympto-
matic SARS-CoV-2 PCR testing. Eight out of 27 HCWs tested
positive, with only three of them going on to develop
symptoms.
In summary, between May 23rd and June 2nd, nine patients
and eight HCWs tested positive for COVID-19. Six of these
samples (Patients 23 and 24, and Staff 1, 2, 5, and 6) were
sequenced. The samples from the two clusters were not closely
related, suggesting that there was no cryptic or undetected
transmission event on Ward A connecting the two clusters.
From Cluster Two, five of the samples were identical, with the
remaining sample (Staff 1) different by just one SNP. Cluster
analysis confirmed that the five identical samples are related,
and, although not related in transcluster analysis, Staff 1 is
likely to be part of the group given the single SNP difference.
Table I
Demographic, epidemiological, and genomic features of the Ward A outbreak
Variable Cluster One Cluster Two Total
Size of epidemiological outbreak
Total 21 17 38
Patients 21 9 30
Healthcare workers 0 8 8
Patients N ¼ 21 N ¼ 9 N ¼ 30
Demographics
Median age (years) 82.5 83.7 82.5
Female 2 (9.5%) 0 2 (6.7%)
Context of positive result
Before transferring to Ward A 3 (14.3%) 0 3
On Ward A 6 (28.6%) 8 (88.9%) 14
On another ward 1 (4.8%) 0 1
On admission to hospital post-exposure 11 (52.4%) 1 (11.1%) 12
Reason for testing
Admission testing on Ward A 0 1 (11.1%) 1
Admission testing in A&E 3 (14.3%) 0 3
Developed symptoms on Ward A 6 (28.6%) 0 6
Screening on Ward A post-exposure 0 7 (77.8%) 7
Screening in A&E post-exposure 11 (52.4%) 1 (11.1%) 12
Screening to facilitate discharge 1 (4.8%) 0 1
Public Health England definitionsa
‘definite healthcare-associated’ 1 1 1
‘probable healthcare-associated’ 3 3 6
‘indeterminate healthcare-associated’ 3 3 6
‘community-acquired’ 0 1 1
No. of patients readmitted
After contact on Ward A 9 1 10
After household contact 2 0 2
Time from Ward A discharge to positive PCR 12.9 7.2
30-day outcome
Death 4 (19.0%) 1 (12.5%) 5 (16.7%)
Staff N ¼ 0 N ¼ 8 N ¼ 8
No. of asymptomatic PCR-positive staff 0 5 5
Genomic investigation
No. of samples sequenced 13 6 19




Median no. of SNPs different 9 0 11
No. of identical genomes 2 5 7
No. of genomes 2 SNPs different 10b 6 16
No. of samples clustered at T ¼ 3 6 5 11 (6 þ 5)
PCR, polymerase chain reaction; SNP, single nucleotid polymorphism.
a Public Health England definitions for ‘healthcare-associated infections’ were applied to patients detected to be SARS-COV-2 positive during their
admission (‘definite’: first positive>15 days after admission; ‘probable’: first positive 8e14 days after admission; ‘indeterminate’: first positive 2e7
days after admission).
b Comprising two groups of seven and three persons.
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This report describes the experiences on an elderly care
ward in April and May 2020. Thirty-eight PCR-confirmed cases
of COVID-19 were related to Ward A during this time-period:
30 patients and eight staff. Genomic sequencing of 19 sam-
ples has identified 16 cases that were related to others by two
SNPs or fewer with cluster analysis identifying two discrete
groups of infection comprising 11 cases (six and five patients
each).This analysis builds upon previously published work dem-
onstrating the utility of genome sequencing in complementing
conventional epidemiological investigation to elucidate the
epidemiology of COVID-19 nosocomial outbreaks [5,15].
First, robust contact tracing of Cluster One identified nine
patients who were on Ward A, discharged to the community,
and then readmitted COVID-19 positive. All of these patients
were exposed to SARS-CoV-2 in hospital but were not part of
routine contact tracing at the time. Our analysis found no
evidence of transmission for between two and five of these
Figure 1. The epidemic curve of 27 cases on Ward A (April 1st to June 2nd). Colours indicate the category of case. Patients 7e9 were
COVID-19 positive prior to admission on to Ward A and are therefore not included in the epidemic curve.
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used to determine transmission plausibility. In this context,
genome sequencing provided evidence to help rule out noso-
comial infection.
Second, despite the above point, genome analysis confirms
that two patients (Patients 10 and 11) who were discharged
fromWard A during Cluster One had viral sequences compatible
with hospital-acquired infection. This has important implica-
tions as patients recently discharged from hospital are not
captured in conventional definitions of hospital-acquired
COVID-19 infection. Interestingly, Patient 10 was readmitted
17 days after discharge fromWard A with asymptomatic COVID-
19 infection, highlighting that time from discharge to positive
test cannot always be relied upon to exclude nosocomial
infection. Moreover, genome sequencing further highlighted
that Patients 1 and 2, although testing positive early into their
hospital admission (four and five days respectively), were
related.
Third, those patients who acquired COVID-19 in hospital and
were discharged have the potential to transmit in the com-
munity. Patient 10 was readmitted after discharge fromWard A
with a genome sequencing suggesting hospital acquisition. It is
likely that there was onward community transmission as whenFigure 2. Timeline plot of patients 1e19 and 22e30. Bars illustrate
date/time of negative PCR test; ‘þ’, date/time of positive PCR test.Patient 10 was readmitted, a member of their household
(Patient 21) was also admitted and tested positive for COVID-
19. Similarly, one patient was diagnosed with COVID-19 infec-
tion after being transferred to another ward from Ward A,
demonstrating the potential hospital-wide effect of unde-
tected cases.
Fourth, analysis of Cluster Two confirms transmission
between patients and staff (although the directionality is
uncertain) as samples from two patients and three HCWs were
identical. This is in keeping with other published literature and
raises important IPC questions.
Finally, as has been reported in other studies, there was a
high level of asymptomatic infection detected in both patients
and HCWs in Cluster Two, illustrating the importance of
screening exposed individuals to identify cases early [16,17].
Interestingly, all of the cases in Cluster One were symptomatic
and this likely reflects the availability of SARS-CoV-2 PCR
testing, which at that time was largely reserved for those with
symptoms. It is thus plausible that asymptomatic infections
(either acquired in the hospital or the community) may not
have been identified in this investigation.
This study has several limitations to discuss. First, since not
all exposed patients underwent testing, it is likely that sometime spent on Ward A. Colours indicate category of patient. ‘e’,
Figure 3. Matrix showing the number of single nucleotide poly-
morphisms different between samples.
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Cluster One and is noteworthy in light of the high rate of
asymptomatic infection reported here. Second, due to limi-
tations on resources, only half of the positive samples (sampled
randomly) were sequenced, which limits our understanding of
the outbreaks. Third, samples from the clustered and non-
clustered samples differ by only one or two SNPs and there-
fore we cannot completely exclude community acquisition in
some of the cases. Finally, contact tracing was performed using
ward handover lists and therefore it is possible that some
patients were missed.Figure 4. Network diagram illustrating the grouping of samples
after genomic and cluster analysis. Colours represent category of
sample (as per Figure 1).The utility of the COG-UK network in providing whole
genome sequencing context to aid in the understanding of
hospital outbreak clusters highlights the benefit that such
technology might have in the future for understanding patho-
gens in acute NHS care.Recommendations
e Test all patients exposed to COVID-19 in hospital regardless
of symptoms.
e Test staff exposed to COVID-19 on non-COVID wards.
e Use genome sequencing to generate and test hypotheses to
improve IPC practices.
e Consider patients readmitted to hospital with COVID-19
after recent discharge as nosocomial infection.Author contributions
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Gouliouris T, et al. Rapid bacterial whole-genome sequencing to
enhance diagnostic and public health microbiology. JAMA Intern
Med 2013;173:1397e404.
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